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Abstract 
 
This paper deals mainly with the historic origins of the special rent-based East-Central 
European development model. The Atlantic competition-based model used to serve as a 
benchmark for the region’s development. However, due to various reasons discussed in 
this paper the Atlantic institutions remained rather weak, and much of the Ottoman-
Balkan model’s features also made lasting imprints. As a result, a specific hybrid socio-
economic model evolved that featured the state-permeated creation of rents and their 
politically predetermined distribution. The rent-based economy’s stability has been 
supported by external political and economic assistance. The social tensions of the 
political and economic backlashes have been covered by politically inflated regional 
conflicts, mainly ethnic rivalry. The study provides evidence on the historic 
determination of these features of the rent-based ECE development model. 
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Introduction 
The historic approach is an important branch of the most current neo-institutionalist 
research efforts (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Tabellini, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; 
Nölke, 2014; Roland, 2018). This string of literature tries to find empirical evidence on 
the impact of historic cultural, political or economic development patterns on current 
social and economic performance. Most specifically for the ECE region Grosjean (2011), 
Djankov and Hauck (2016) conducted research tracing back current performance 
deviations to historic imperial affiliation of various ECE regions. Grosfeld and 
Zhuravskaya (2015) tested within country differences of Poland. They found that most 
of the historic economic differences stemming from the partition period of the country 
disappeared. However, differences in the intensity of religious practices and beliefs in 
democratic ideals remained in place still influencing political, social and economic 
institutions and processes.  Djankov and Hauck (2016) compared the transition 
performance of East-Central European and post-soviet countries. They stated that 
political systems’ differences have been greater than economic development patterns’. 
Countries of the Roman Catholic and protestant religions moved quicker and more 
definitely towards Western-type political democracy than Orthodox or Muslim (post-
Byzantine) countries. Also, the imperial affiliation (Austria-Hungary versus Ottoman 
Empire and Russia) proved to be an important factor of differences. While they thought 
that economic performance was less uneven, it seems likely that the economic 
institutions and systems might have developed differently. 
Some pieces of the literature provide some details of the nature of historic differences 
that they test for current day impacts (for example Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015; and 
Grosjean, 2011). These are important contributions to the better understanding of the 
linkages: they do not treat the past as black box. However, only a few historians made 
efforts to develop a theory of comparative historic systems (Szűcs, 1983). The complex 
comparative view of historic models is an important precondition for the reliable 
explanation of the nature and rationale of the historic differences that made long lasting 
imprints in social and economic development of the ECE region. The main aim of this 
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paper is to trace back historically the differences between the major European socio-
economic models. 
The analysis of the historic events and processes is carried out in four main 
dimensions. These seem to be significant in historic terms and also applicable in 
explaining the current differences of economic systems. The exceptionally quick and 
powerful economic development of the early capitalism that created the most significant 
difference between European nations, was based on economic liberty, decentralized and 
not hierarchical organization of the economy, contractual business conduct on all levels 
and political and economic independence of the countries. More closely, the analysis of 
property rights, centralized/decentralized social and political structure, the existence of 
contractual relationships or rather command economy and the degree of economic and 
political independence is carried out2. The analysis will compare social, political and 
economic development trends focusing on those periods and features that earmarked a 
detour from the Western (Atlantic) development model. 
The analysis starts with the early medieval times with the Byzantine Empire 
upholding rather rigidly the heritage of the Roman Empire and the chaotic 
circumstances in the West that dissolved both the ancient and failed political and 
economic structure but also the tribal heritage of the victorious German peoples (see 
also in Kundera, 1984). This anarchy, the destruction of the previous social institutions 
and models created a very much decentralized economic and political scene with the 
dominance of local landlords or warlords. The only stable framework structure that was 
also socially acknowledged was the Roman Catholic Church that also played the role of 
archive and preserved the timely rather remote heritage of the ancient cultures. This 
bipolar setup was typical for the eight hundred years after the fall of the Roman Empire 
in the West until the collapse of the Byzantine Empire in the East during the fourteenth-
fifteenth century. Thereafter the Byzantine heritage split. The sacral center was 
integrated into the then boosting Russian empire. The territory of the ancient Byzantine 
was captured by the ottomans. They too integrated much of the ancient heritage and 
combined it with values of the Islamic confession. Thus, by the fifteenth century, the 
                                                 
2 These dimensons are also key veriables of the comparative model applied by Roland (2018). 
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starting point of the takeoff of the Atlantic model two other, alternative socio-economic 
models existed in Europe: the Russian-orthodox and the Ottoman. In the following parts 
of the paper first the Atlantic and the Byzantine/Russian  models are compared, than the 
Ottoman characteristics are added. The final part describes the development pattern of 
East-Central Europe as a mixture of the archetype models. 
 
The Atlantic and Byzantine models 
After the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire the lack of central state power, 
anarchy followed, landlords and tribal kings exercised military and political power in 
the various segments of the ancient empire. This decentralized power structure 
dissolved both the old imperial institutional structure with the prominent role of the 
imperator, the military service and public administration, and also the tribal heritage of 
the conquerors. The only stable institutional framework that remained in place was the 
Christian Church that also preserved much of the antique cultural heritage. In fact, Rome 
was the only steady point and authority that institutionally integrated the Western part 
of Europe in this period. In the Eastern part of the empire the Byzantine Empire 
followed the old suit and preserved in an increasingly rigid fashion the centralized state 
functions and institutions with the imperator on top as the mundane governor of God. 
The state hierarchy was organized as centralized bureaucratic and military order in top-
down fashion. This model was later taken over by the Ottomans in their military-
theocratic autocracy too. 
The Atlantic model became more decentralized with bottom-up social hierarchy on 
top of which the emperor was the head of vassals who was bound by social customs 
later also by legal contracts to perform duties and to exercise rights that were allocated 
to him by the society. The social hierarchy was treated as human institution and people 
at lower level social status also preserved some social respect. The separation of 
spiritual and secular, society and state in the Atlantic model was a major deviation from 
the late Roman and Byzantine heritage. The overwhelming spread and integrating 
power of the tributary relationships produced a society of feudal ranks. The 
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membership in given social strata or rank was the strongest determinant of personal 
identity, stronger than for example nationality. This concept of political power and social 
cohesion was also strongly supported by the Roman Catholic Church. The systemic 
divide had evolved between the fifth and ninth centuries (Kundera, 1984; Szűcs, 1983) 
and culminated in the factual divide of the two major branches of the Christian Religion 
(schisma), as well as state- and society forming principles of the regions influenced by 
them. 
By the first millennium the Atlantic model of feudalism was fully developed. The 
specific Atlantic development trend provided important drivers for boosting the 
economy, especially agriculture. This resulted in the important technological changes of 
the eleventh-thirteenth century. The medieval technological revolution also launched a 
demographic revolution. Western Europe’s population had doubled during this three 
hundred years. Accelerated urbanization was boosted by peasant migration. Towns 
enjoyed important liberties in many functional areas, most importantly in self-
regulation of their own internal relations including crafts that were concentrated in 
guilds. This process propelled urban citizenry to higher levels of social appreciation that 
was also expressed in their presence in politics. Szűcs (1983) emphasized that these 
processes could unfold also because of the lack of high centralization of state 
bureaucracy, economy or military functions (weak state). The Atlantic model featured a 
spatially dense, decentralized urban structure with increasing volumes of trade and 
other exchanges in a largely autonomous, self-governing institutional setting. The 
Eastern metropoles served as headquarters of the central or regional administrative and 
military organization and included heterogeneous population. The staff of state- 
military- and religious institutions depended financially from the prebendal incomes 
and not from merchandise or crafs activity pursued in the town. They were linked 
together through state institutions and not the municipality. Otherwise the urban 
network remained loose, economically weak, politically insignificant. 
The acceleration of economic and demographic growth between the eleventh and 
fourteenth centuries provided then the necessary economic and political power of 
establishing stronger, more centralized monarchies in Western Europe. This process 
- 6 - 
Miklós Szanyi /The three archetype European historic development models 
and their impact in East-Central Europe 
 
reduced the degree of liberty of the various social strata and strengthened the power of 
the sovereign. Also, the role and influence of the Roman Catholic Church was reduced. 
Political centralization was a response to the major crisis of feudalism that happened 
during the fourteenth century. Further expansion of the feudal states within their 
accessible territories became difficult. The increasing population suffered from 
congestion and famine, political anarchy and not independent from these the major pest 
epidemic that killed half of the European population. 
Three main features of the Atlantic model helped Western cultures overcome the 
crisis. They all contributed to the evolution of a still newer model that of capitalism. 
Firstly, the economic weight of urban settlements increased and took over agriculture. 
Money as well as all kinds of handicraft products necessary for state servants and the 
military stemmed from urban settlements and the evolving bourgeoisie, engaging in 
long distance trade already in the fourteenth century but especially after 1492. Secondly, 
despite of brutal repressions of peasant movements and riots the economic relationship 
of peasant and landlord was increasingly based on land rent and was also monetized. 
Feudalistic features of the contracts lessened and the peasants’ personal independence 
increased. This was later a crucial precondition of urban industrial development, 
especially from the sixteenth century. Thirdly, spatial expansion of the countries became 
possible from the fifteenth century. Finally, the grand geographic discoveries provided 
occupation and expansion room for the oversize population. But they also provided the 
necessary boost to corporate capitalism first in the Netherlands and Britain, later in 
other Western states too. 
Overcoming the crisis prepared the ways for the centralization of political power. The 
absolute monarchy became the typical form of state of the Atlantic model between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. At this stage some elements of the East-European 
absolute monarchy, the Russian Empire were similar, although the Russian model was 
based on different fundamentals. The Russian political centralization’s most important 
element was the elimination of the boyars by Ivan III. Spatial expansion soon followed 
with the conquest of Eastern, Asian and Southern territories. This provided the 
necessary incomes for the state and also space for expansion for the following three 
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centuries. These opportunities helped sustaining thy Byzantine model in Eastern 
Europe. It still differed largely from the Atlantic one. The Russian development stuck to 
the subordination and state control of the spiritual life and the supremacy of the state 
and the head of the state, the Tsar over every citizen. The Russian aristocracy could find 
prestigious positions only in service of the sovereign, either in the bureaucracy or the 
military. On lower levels of the society serfdom was maintained. This type of economic 
expansion kept nobility supporting the centralized state power. 
Sixteenth-seventeenth century absolute monarchies tried to reconstruct or at least 
preserve the existing feudal structures. In the Western mode this meant a rather 
perverse symbiosis of old and new social and economic institutions. The monarchy 
centralized economic and political power in order to generate the necessary resources 
to finance itself, including the aristocracy, but it relied on revenues coming from 
expanding trade and manufacturing activity of the third rank that he effectively 
supported. The foundation of the first commercial companies like the Dutch West India 
Company (founded in 1621) or the British Hudson’s Bay Company (founded in 1670, 
still existing) and many others simultaneously served the imperial interest of the 
sovereign and the commercial interest of the business people. The absolute monarchy 
effectively supported the business success of these companies even by the use of 
military force (e.g. the British occupation of New Amsterdam on the Southern tip of 
Manhattan Island). Thus, the Western absolute monarchy accelerated the erosion of the 
old feudal structures even if it wanted to preserve them. The absolute monarchies 
opened the ways for the early capitalist development with some rather uniform policies. 
The inflated state bureaucracy, permanent military service (mostly paid professional 
soldiers and also marines), centralized state organizations (ministries), homogenization 
of the subjects, mercantilism and protectionist economic policies were applied rather 
generally. 
The Russian absolute monarchy was established rather quickly after the elimination 
of the renitent boyars (the last competing economic and political force against the 
emperor) by III. Ivan. Contrary to the Western pattern it gained economic power from 
centralized policies and the territorial expansion that did not meet serious competitors 
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after the collapse of the Mongolian rule and the decline of Ottoman Empire. The political 
centralization was therefore rather a continuation of the previous patterns in Russia. 
The similar policies with the West (bureaucracy, military, protectionism, etc.) served 
solely the state interest and their actors were state servants. The stability of the system 
was further strengthened by the legal codification of serfdom. Homogenization of the 
subjects was done by Peter the Great who established the unified 14 class system of 
state servants, a continuation of the ancient servant system. Sporadically existing urban 
self regulation was also subdued by III. Ivan who occupied and plundered Novgorod, and 
deported its citizens (1478). Thus, the Russian absolutism did not leave any social strata 
without central control and dirigisme. Mercantilism in the Russian Empire meant 
business support of the state and the emperor who was a monopolist of trade and 
manufacturing (most importantly in military-related industries). These tools produced 
limited success in the modernization of Russia too but lagged behind in development 
thrust compared to self-governance and entrepreneurship of the Atlantic model. 
In later capitalist development of the two models the difference in the legitimation of 
the sovereigns played an important role. In the Atlantic model the legitimation of the 
concentrated political power around the sovereign stemmed from the old social contract 
that allowed its legitimate change when the bourgeoisie required more influence in state 
matters. The legitimation base of the Russian Empire was different. From III. Ivan on the 
Orthodox Church established a neo-byzantine framework structure for the Russian state 
reconstructing autocratic state mysticism. Missionary role was allocated to the Tsar of 
all Russian subjects, the mundane governor of god and Moscow the “third Rome”. 
Russian subjects’ role was that of the servants in this divine division of labor. The 
Orthodox Church still had big spiritual influence in the society but was interlocked with 
the centralized political power. The true unity of autocracy, orthodoxy and serving 
subjects supported the central figure of the system, the Tsar. This system proved to be 
rather stable on the one hand and very rigid and slow to react to changes on the other. 
Its development depended on the talents of the absolute ruler. 
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Some features of the Ottoman-Balkan model 
Thy Byzantine Empire had lost influence over much of the Balkans during the 
fourteenth century. The territory of the current day Macedonia and Bulgaria, later also 
Serbia was lost to the Ottomans and the Romanian principalities became their vassals. 
Finally, Constantinople also fell in 1453, and the whole territory became part of the 
Ottoman Empire. Hence the Ottoman version of the Byzantine development model 
evolved in the region parallel with the Russian version in the territory of Eastern Slavic 
peoples. 
The Islamic heritage was combined with the Byzantine. An important common 
feature was the exceptionally high prestige of the sovereign (the imperator and the 
caliph) supported by strong religious institutions and a centralized state apparatus. The 
empire at its apex in the sixteenth century was basically bureaucratic rather than feudal. 
The force and extent of central command was too powerful during the sixteenth century 
to permit local notables to capture customary rights for themselves. The almighty 
emperor owned all lands, tangibles and subjects of the empire and the actuation of its 
various systems was charged to professionals rewarded after their performance. The 
most important was the military performance. The cutting edge Ottoman army was 
supported by two economic institutions designed to maintain military supremacy: land 
tenure and craft regulation. 
The timar system of land tenure was granted for military occupation and tax 
collection. Newly acquired land was incorporated in the system used for the 
remuneration of participants in successful campaigns. Recipients got the land granted by 
the sultan to collect prescribed amounts (10-20 %) of harvest to maintain the several 
horses and horsemen that the grant obliged him to bring to the summer campaigns. The 
grant also directed them to collect money taxes from the peasants, most importantly the 
head tax paid for the exemption of the adult, non-Moslem males from military service. 
This type of land tenure was not the Western-type peasant serfdom. It was instead a 
system of military occupation, staffed and controlled by the central government. The 
urban residents were obliged to belong to one of guilds (esnafi). Their origins too lay in a 
combination of Byzantine precedent and the Islamic ethics. The Porte organized the 
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guilds into a comprehensive system to control non-agricultural activity and urban 
population. On the one hand the state leased facilities for all guild shops to prevent 
private ownership and unauthorized changes in the products. On the other hand, a list of 
maximum prices for artisan guild wares was fixed, which was based on the Islamic code 
of commercial conduct by fixing the rate of profit by 10 percent. Local judges and 
inspectors enforced the regulations. 
Both rural and urban activities were regulated by institutions of the central 
government not allowing the existence of private property and blocking private 
initiatives. The system effectively supported the military expansion of the Ottoman 
Empire. But the expansion came to a halt in the seventeenth century. Boosting trade 
performance, the starting capitalist development with its new business models relying 
extensively on capital collection and credits multiplied the economic strength of the 
West-European nations. In contrast the Ottoman performance was further restricted by 
the absence of commercial banking tradition that was barred by the Islamic legal code. 
Central government’s power started to decline while the absolute monarchies 
strengthened on the basis of capitalist economic expansion. The economic fundamentals 
of the Ottoman Empire were shaken both in agriculture and manufactured goods. 
The ailing timar system and the ownership monopoly of the Caliph had to be given up 
since rule and order had declined in the empire and the state monopoly could not be 
effectively enforced. By 1630 the number of timar on the Balkans fell from 63000 in 
1475 to 8000 (Lampe and Jackson, 1982, p.26.). By the eighteenth century many of the 
rural notables became influential enough to take over all local authority from the central 
government. They became virtual warlords. A new rural regime chiflik was created far 
less amenable to central control than the timar system. The estates could be passed on 
to the chiflik owners’ sons. The property monopoly of the emperor was thus banned. 
However, despite of the appearance of private ownership the commercial sale of land 
remained curtailed. In fact, until the late nineteenth century no formal code existed to 
define property rights for the marketplace. This hiatus together with the ban on 
charging interest on loans effectively blocked the development of capital markets and 
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institutions. The small size of the land units prevented them from realizing economies of 
scale. Moreover, the peasants were ruled as serfs. 
The increasing oppression led to peasants migrating to areas not under the control of 
chiflik. Increasing instability and growing oppression launched massive long-distance 
migration from the empire to the North. Greek, Serb and Bulgarian peasants and 
merchants settled to the Romanian principalities and Hungary. Between 1690 and 1718 
half of the Serbian peasant villages were left deserted. Several hundred thousand 
persons, 40000 families moved to the depopulated Southern parts of Hungary (Lampe 
and Jackson, 1982, p. 46.). Merchants moved to the Romanian and Hungarian towns (for 
example to Újvidék, Bucuresti, Giurgiu). 
 
East-Central Europe between the two development poles 
Feudal states of ECE had been established during the tenth and eleventh centuries 
when the development of the Western feudal model had been completed and its 
schemes were used by the peoples of ECE to create more stable, institutionally solid 
feudal states. State formation occurred simultaneously in Poland, Czechia, Hungary and 
Croatia around the year 1000 with the strong support of the Roman Catholic Church and 
neighboring feudal states of Germany and Italy. The border line of the Atlantic model 
had been extended from the borders of the Caroling Empire to the ECE region. The 
inherited tribal structure (found both in the early German and later Hungarian and 
Polish societies, the “Gefolgschaft”) was not transformed to the Western type chivalry 
with decentralized economic (feudal tenure) and political structure (tribute). ECE was 
propelled into the development process in the period when the classic chivalry started 
to give place to the feudal ranks from the ninth century. Therefore, this later phase did 
not root in the first one, when the organic evolution of the feudal ranks and their socially 
embedded relationships took place in the West. Rather, the later phase’s structures were 
imitated by the use of central power in ECE. Hence their social embeddedness was 
different and provided much weaker traditions of decentralized, economically and 
politically autonomous functioning. This is a big difference compared to the Atlantic 
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model’s gradual evolution process that fundamentally determined social relationships, 
institutional embeddedness, and the way of thinking. This was a top-down process 
assisted also by the Roman Catholic Church. The balance between various social strata 
and the position of the sovereign was different. The “modernization effort” required 
strong centralized political power that allowed relatively less freedom and liberty for 
the society. Even the process of urbanization was initiated and promoted by the 
sovereigns partly also because of the need for social and economic support for the 
centralized monarchy. The process of social embeddedness of the feudal institutions was 
completed only during the thirteenth century in ECE. 
The successful consolidation period of feudalism in ECE region was followed also 
here by economic and demographic expansion in the thirteenth century up till the 
mid1300s, similarly to the Western patterns. Western technological and social 
innovations were taken over in ECE countries. From the social processes most important 
was that peasantry was homogenized and treated as special social strata. Urbanization 
took place, though less intensively than in the West, and much of the process was bound 
to active recruitments for migration mainly from Germany. At the end of the 1270s 
parallel with more Western states national assemblies of nobility and clericals (who 
were assisting the administrative roles in the feudal states as experts in law and other 
sciences) started to gather. Szűcs emphasizes also the timely appearance of contracts 
between landlords and peasants in both Poland and Hungary (Szűcs, 1981, p. 333). This 
is an important Western feature that had been absent to the East and South of the ECE 
region. 
Another important consequence of the ECE feudal development pattern was the 
relatively larger social strata of nobility which had proliferated exactly at the time of 
taking over the institutions of the feudal rank system that were promptly utilized for the 
strengthening of the privileges of the oversized nobility. The local nobility powerful in 
size and influence became later the most important barrier of social development in 
ECE3. Last but not least urban development also remained relatively weak. The number 
                                                 
3 By the eve of capitalist development, the share of nobility in total population was around 1 % in the 
Western countries, 5 % in Hungary and 7-8 % in Poland (Szűcs, 1981, p. 335). 
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of towns did not increase between 1200 and 1350. Hence, it is small wonder that in the 
feudal national assemblies of Poland and Hungary representatives of towns were usually 
not invited. The political representation of the nation was captured by the nobility. 
European crisis of feudalism hit the ECE region only by the late fifteenth century. The 
late monarchs of the feudal ranks period, the Hunyadis in Hungary and the Jagiello 
dynasty in Poland pursued successful external policies. They could resist the Ottoman 
advance and kept on competing for ECE supremacy with the Habsburg family’s Eastern 
branch. The Ottoman advance in Hungary as well as continuous attacks against the 
Southern flanks of the Polish-Lithuanian confederation soon pushed also the ECE region 
into crisis. Unlike successful Western countries or even the Russian Empire, ECE did not 
find room for economic and political expansion and became dependent of larger 
neighboring powers. In fact, the process has already started with the death of the last 
powerful kings in the succeeding feudal anarchy. Poland and Hungary were dominated 
by the coalitions of local nobility the role of urban citizenry remained marginal both 
politically and economically, peasants were pushed back to serfdom by the late 1490s in 
all ECE states. The obsolete military structure of nobility was however not able to resist 
the Ottoman attacks. Both Hungary and Poland lost their political independence and 
were occupied by stronger neighboring states and were treated as borderland, a 
defensive region. This status further curtailed economic development. 
The seventeenth-eighteenth century development of the ECE region was a special 
hybrid of the Atlantic and Byzantine models. The mingle of the elements of the two 
models is seen in several aspects in the Habsburg Empire. Serfdom for example was 
restored in Hungary, but at the same time peasants were represented in the national 
assemblies of Tirol and Vorarlberg. The degree of centralization could never reach the 
levels experienced in Russia. The various parts of the monarchy possessed special legal 
and institutional systems remaining from their independent periods. Joseph II. (1780-
1790) made substantial efforts to unify the empire but cancelled his reform acts on his 
deathbed. Nevertheless, the maintenance of territorial integrity of the empire was 
reinforced by ruthless military force similar to Russian conflicts. The riot of the Czech 
nobility was declined with exceptional brutality (1620). The rebel Hungarians were 
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given similar treatment several times (1671, 1703-11, 1848-49). However, the 
unexpectedly strong opposition of the Hungarian society forced the Austrian absolutism 
to conduct compromises, which could not be possible in the empire of the Tsars, and has 
no parallel in the West either. 
The lack of social and national homogenization in the ECE region is also an important 
result of the hybrid form of absolutism. The most important centripetal force of the 
Habsburg Monarchy was loyalty to the dynasty, but not to the state like in centralized 
Russia. With the advance of nationalism, the centrifugal forces grew bigger and 
destroyed the Habsburg Monarchy. In the new setting after the First World War 
successor states inherited all social problems of the Monarchy, most importantly the 
weak democratic tradition based on the body of civil society. Another feature was the 
lack of homogenous societies and political centralization that served group interests in 
terms of both social strata and nationalities. Szűcs concludes: “Hungary maneuvered 
into a dead-end street after 1526… the essence of which was that Hungarian history 
moved with its more ‘Western’ like temper into such an ‘ECE-type’ structure during the 
‘East-European’ feudal crisis that excluded solution of the crisis situation following 
either the Western or the Eastern pattern. On the one hand the serious defensive nature 
of the regional situation made impossible the organization of Western type ‘national 
monarchies’, on the other hand, the existence of the western-like corpus politicum  
excluded the Russian-type one sided subordination to any imperial absolutism” (Szűcs, 
1981 p. 352). While the West featured national absolutism and Russia imperial 
autocracy in the eve of capitalist development ECE countries’ feudal nobility continued 
sticking to its privileged political status based on the feudal ranks, and matching social 
and political institutions including feudal serfdom. The possibility of social contract 
based political development towards popular sovereignty was largely blocked by this 
development. 
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Essential differences of the three models 
Using the statements of the above analysis it is possible to compare the European 
development models of the period of capitalist take-off in the seventeenth-nineteenth 
century. As it is usual in European historic analysis we use the Atlantic model as 
benchmark mainly because it proved to be most competitive in this period. However, it 
is important to note that the other three models also showed historic stability over time. 
What differs is their ability to contribute to the overall economic and social development 
in their areas. The most important aspects of the Atlantic model’s success are observed 
in the four models. Findings are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Systemic features of the four European development models 
 Atlantic Russian Ottoman-Balkan ECE 
Land 
ownership 
private 
ownership 
state ownership emperor/landlords landlords 
Urban 
development 
dense, self- 
governing 
administrative 
centers 
administrative 
centers 
self-governing, 
weak 
Degree of 
centralization 
decentralized 
state-permeated 
highly 
centralized 
administratively 
regulated 
admin. regulated 
state-permeated 
Ethnic 
homogeneity 
relatively 
homogenous 
heterogeneous heterogeneous heterogeneous 
Independence independent independent 
economically 
dependent 
economically and 
politically dependent 
 
The capitalist take-off of the seventeenth-eighteenth century was largely promoted by 
the massive reallocation of capital and labor from agriculture to industry. Profits from 
agribusiness were invested in industry and trade, and commercial activities were 
financed to an increasing degree by interest loans provided by an expanding financial 
sector and capital markets. This process required that barriers to the flow of capital and 
labor were lessened if not removed entirely, and the Weberian ethos of profit making 
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economic activity (including financial services) rose (Weber, 1927). The four European 
development models met these requirements to different degrees. 
Perhaps the most important constituent of this process was the presence of private 
ownership, ability of capital owners to control the usage and the income streams from 
their investments. No less important was the adequate legal regulation and institutional 
framework that guaranteed property right enforcement thus creating trust in business. 
The archetype of the modern capitalist property right system is found of course in the 
Atlantic model. The most important milestone in this regard is perhaps land ownership: 
whether land is in private ownership and if yes, is it is negotiable or not. The free 
transferability of land ownership in the Atlantic model allows massive reallocation of 
capital from agriculture to commercial business, moreover it is suitable collateral for the 
extension of interest loans. The most remote status compared to this was the Russian 
model of state ownership. Until the 1905 Stolipin reforms land was leased by the state to 
private persons, but the property rights could not be obtained. The same principle was 
applied in the Ottoman-Balkan model’s timar system, and also the later revisions of land 
tenure rights included various forms of state ownership. The chiflik on the other hand 
introduced private ownership, yet ownership rights could not be transferred in 
commercial contracts. Similarly, ECE land ownership was also based on non-
transferable private property. The right to transfer land ownership from one subject to 
another was reserved for the emperor. Attached to this land tenure model serfdom was 
reintroduced in ECE, and the role of peasants in Ottoman chiflik was also similar. 
Serfdom blocked the legal migration of the labor from agriculture to towns and 
commercial activities. 
Urbanization relied on long traditions of decentralized economic and political 
development patterns in the Atlantic model that produced a dense network of urban 
settlements equipped with high level self-governance. Urban commercial activities 
provided the thrust of early capitalist development. In the Russian and Ottoman-Balkan 
models no comparable network of self-governing urban settlements developed. Towns 
were mainly used as administrative, religious and military centers. The most important 
ones were inflated to large megapolises of the time consisting of diverse population that 
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served their state- religious- or military related superiors and not the municipalities. 
The esnafi system’s strict central regulation aimed exactly the curtailment of private 
property development. Islam’s usury prohibition further reduced incentives for private 
initiatives and effectively banned the development of interest-based financial 
transactions and modern financial system (see: Kuran, 2011, an empirical test on 
current impacts is provided by Grosjean, 2011). In the ECE model urban development 
was similar to the Western archetype, however the density of urban settlements was 
lower. Because of the borderland status and continuous wars large areas were 
depopulated in the ECE regions. Only a loose urban settlement structure remained that 
typically collected peasants migrating from war torn villages to the more protective 
towns that usually remained in the possession of the Sultan. Economic activity in these 
settlements was basically agrarian. 
A third important aspect of systemic differences is the organization of the state and 
its involvement in economic regulation. The analysis in this article showed that the 
Atlantic model had evolved from a fundamentally decentralized, at the beginning 
perhaps even chaotic political structure. The coexistence of various economic and 
political power centers provided bottom-up social legitimation for the state. This basic 
feature could not be depressed entirely even in the apex of the absolute monarchy. On 
the contrary, decentralized business of emerging bourgeoisie lived in close symbiosis 
with centralized political power featuring the state as simultaneous promoter of 
imperial and private business interests. This combination made the Atlantic model’s 
economic and political expansion extremely powerful. In contrast to this the ancient 
Byzantine state model survived in both the Russian and the Ottoman-Balkan model. The 
supremacy of the state was without question the most important driver of Russian 
development that effectively used political and military power for the expropriation of 
agrarian population and the peoples of newly acquired lands for the purpose of 
industrialization and infrastructural development. Instead of relying on private business 
and market-driven allocation of resources, the Russian state itself commanded the 
industrialization process. It seems that the Ottoman-Balkan model could not effectively 
modernize its bureaucratic state structure. Oversized and inefficient bureaucracy 
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provided declining power of control over the provinces of the huge territory of the 
empire. The disorganization of the empire gave room for the emergence of self-
appointed landlords and warlords. Effective tax collection had remained a big problem 
resulting in declining state revenues. Thus, unlike Russia the Ottoman Empire was 
unable to initiate effective industrialization and modernization. 
In the ECE region the nature of state organization and involvement varied. The few 
attempts to apply homogenization policies applied in absolute monarchies principally 
failed. This allows the assumption that the central state was less powerful and efficient 
than for example in Russia. But the centralization efforts were blocked by the local 
nobility and not the evolving bourgeoisie. Self-governing ambitions were especially 
strong in the nobility, far less in the otherwise weak bourgeoisie. The nobility 
successfully reinforced the protection of its inherited feudal privileges including 
serfdom and ban on commercial alienation of land. The state policies served permeation 
of capitalist development to varying degree among the regions. The true borderland to 
the Ottoman Empire received little support. On the contrary, the Habsburg emperors 
successfully supported the embourgeoisation in the Austrian and Czech territories at the 
expense of the Hungarian and Polish parts that were treated as agricultural suppliers of 
the more industrialized lands. The directions of trade within the empire was regulated 
by the double tariff system between 1754 and 1850. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) 
found significant and lasting differences in state activity in the various parts of Poland 
during the partition period with higher level of industrialization in the German 
(Prussian) controlled part, more liberal and decentralized state bureaucracy in the 
Austrian part and stronger (though unsuccessful) homogenization efforts in the part 
controlled by Russia. Thus, state permeation of capitalist development had been present 
but affected the various ECE regions differently, the least effectively the parts of the 
borderland. 
Ethnic homogeneity is an important issue since it serves social cohesion. The 
homogeneity of the ethnic structure depended on two factors: the desirability of 
integration to the social structure of the state in power and the deliberation and 
strength of the state towards homogenizing the peoples of the empire. In the Atlantic 
- 19 - 
Miklós Szanyi /The three archetype European historic development models 
and their impact in East-Central Europe 
 
model the bottom-up evolution of the societies provided better opportunities for the 
establishment of ethnically homogenous societies in many cases with various political 
and legal institutions serving the adequate representation of marginal interests. This is 
reflected in the federal state system and the two chambers parliamentary structure in 
many countries of the Atlantic model. The Russian empire also made attempts to 
reinforce ethnic homogenization. Grosfeld and Zhurarvskaya (2015) provided some 
historic evidence on this in the case of Poland including also the mass-scale deportation 
of various ethnic groups to the newly acquired and remote underpopulated parts of the 
empire. In the case of the Ottoman Empire the main division line in the society was 
drawn along the religions. Only Islamic peoples obtained opportunities to become 
respected servants of the sultan, Christians and Jews were treated as secondary citizens 
and were also harassed by the majority, especially during the late 1800s and in 1916. 
Therefore, even if certain peoples like the Bosnians changed religion and hence also 
social status, the multiethnic structure of the Ottoman empire remained in place. Also, 
within the Islamic religion serious tensions survived that also took the form of ethnic 
rivalry. 
In the case of ECE ethnic homogeneity could not be achieved. The spontaneous or 
state administered assimilation of ethnic minorities has remained unsuccessful. The 
Habsburgs for example replaced the Czech aristocracy by German/Austrian one after 
1620 and massive immigration occurred around the Czech ethnic border line. Yet, the 
Czech nation and its culture survived. Hungary with its larger size was more difficult 
case. In this multiethnic part of the Empire the Habsburgs intended to counterbalance 
the ethnic weight of Hungarians with mass scale settling of Germans and other peoples 
especially in the depopulated borderland areas in Southern Hungary. Ethnic 
homogenization of Poland was not successful either. By the time of the evolution of 
nation states in the eighteenth century Poland lost independence to three larger 
empires. Thus, multiethnic structure of the region has changed only after Second World 
War when the Polish inhabitants of Eastern Poland moved to the territories gained from 
defeated Germany, where German inhabitants were driven away from. Massive people 
movements and the Nazi genocide of Polish Jews under German occupation established 
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an ethnically fairly homogenous Poland only by the 1950s. Germans in Czechia were also 
deported after Second World War thus homogenizing the Czech lands. However, 
multiethnicity of most other ECE countries remained in place producing continuous 
tensions among the peoples of the ECE region in all directions. Resentment and hostility 
against historic rivals have remained strong also in the relatively homogenous Poland 
(Germans and Russians) and Czechia (Germans, Austrians). 
The effective role of the state in historic modernization of society and economy 
largely depended on its opportunities to tap external sources for the domestic 
development. The Atlantic model effectively utilized the resources of the colonies 
monopolizing trade with them. The expropriation of newly acquired Eastern and 
Southern territories gave also the Russian Empire abundant new material and fiscal 
resources to maintain strong military and administrative control and develop 
infrastructural networks. The Ottoman Empire used to monopolize eastern trade routes 
between China and Europe. However, this monopoly vanished in the sixteenth century. 
The importance of Levantean trade was pushed back after the discovery of the Americas. 
Instead, Ottoman trade was specialized on agricultural commodities most importantly 
grain. Trade was carried out mainly by non-muslim population towards Italy and the 
ECE region. Thus, commercial activity increased the economic potential of politically 
subdued Christian (Greek, Armenian and Serbian) and Jewish population thus increasing 
internal ethnic tensions in the empire. By the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire 
became economically dependent from various Western state creditors who extended 
loans for the Porta to purchase necessary industrial goods and finance badly needed 
infrastructural developments. 
ECE lost political independence after the military failure of its nobility. Lost 
independence largely increased the region’s economic vulnerability too. Self-governance 
suffered and the direction of state permeation policies usually worked against their 
modernization needs. Most importantly, they had not been big and powerful enough to 
participate in the geographic expansion process of the early capitalist era. The least so 
when they lost independence. In many cases they themselves suffered from the 
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expropriation policies of their conqueror, even if their status had not been equal with 
the colonies of states in the Atlantic model. 
The rent-based dependent capitalist model of ECE 
From the analysis of the three European historic models the main features of the 
modern ECE countries’ socio-economic model can be drawn. Modern history of the ECE 
region featured the breakup of the dominant empires. Independent small states have 
been established in the region. They all inherited special mixes of the three archetype 
European models’ elements. They all showed repeated swings in their development 
patterns between the Atlantic and the Ottoman-Balkan models. Nevertheless, despite of 
the oscillation a few structural elements show stability in the region. The most 
important one is the role of rents in the society. Unlike in the Atlantic model where the 
main organizing principle of the society is competition and self-governance, ECE states 
and governments distribute various licenses, privileges, material benefits based on 
political loyalty. Due to the weak democratic social institutions (lack of self-governance 
experience) society does not exercise strong control over the rent distribution process 
of the governments. Citizens are not self-confident either: the level of entrepreneurship 
is low, the society does not tolerate competition. Without social and political control rent 
seeking poses not just the risk of moral hazard. Rent seeking becomes the primary form 
of subsistence. During the transition period all the succeeding governments and elites in 
ECE countries tapped various sources of rent. Honest “reformers” (Gajdar, Bokros, 
Balcerowicz for example) were rare and their personal impact was not overwhelming 
therefore the creation and utilization of rents could not be limited and replaced by 
competition based activities. The momentum of social development process patterns 
turned over and eroded pro-competition policies. 
The strong social underpinning of the rent economy stems also from the traditions of 
state centralization, the omnipotent state bureaucracy, the Byzantine heritage of overly 
exaggerated trust and admiration for the head of state (be it imperator, president or 
prime minister). The lack of private initiatives and entrepreneurship is also linked to the 
weak private property institutions. It is not only the lack of experience, but rather a 
legally predetermined situation: in both the Russian and the Ottoman models’ legal 
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institutions private property was not defined. Rather, state owned assets’ utilization 
rights were extended, in many cases auctioned for private persons. Rents stemming 
from various types of properties or licenses (e.g. tax collection) were the main carriers 
of economic activity. This practice directly affected not only the territory of Russia and 
the Ottoman Empire, but also the neighboring area of the Habsburg Empire (mainly 
historic Hungary) and Poland (especially after its partition). 
The conception of the rent-based economy of the ECE development model uses the 
recent research findings of Mihályi and Szelényi (2017; 2019). Their main concern is the 
separation of profits and wages on the one hand and rents as income source on the 
other. The differentiation is crucial because the levels of profits and wages are 
determined by the market process and competition in a positive sum game situation 
(dynamic efficiency). In comparison rents exhibit a zero sum game: rentiers increase 
incomes at the expense of others. Rents do not deliver incentives to economic agents and 
therefore they deteriorate the allocative and dynamic efficiency of the economy. Rents 
were essential parts of all pre-capitalist societies. The exceptional acceleration of 
economic development occurred when the traditional feudal sources of rents 
(privileges) lost importance and non-privileged classes of the society took over the 
command in the economy. The Weberian entrepreneurship succeeded in the 
transatlantic world, however, this does not mean that rents disappeared altogether. But 
rents should be only secondary sources of income behind profits and wages. In contrast 
the rent-based economy does not share the values of the competition state for example 
the separation of the spheres of business and politics, political and economic 
competition, political and social control over politics and business. The primary goal of 
the system is the opposite: the creation of close ties between the two spheres and 
capturing the business by a usually autocratic political regime. 
Political dependence of the ECE region distorted economic development as well. 
During the time of the Turkish wars the area was not worth to invest in due to the high 
risks of enemy invasion. Large areas were depopulated. Later on the dominant states 
made no serious modernization efforts either. The ECE region served as market and raw 
material and food supplier of more industrialized parts of the empires. They were cut off 
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from the economic resources of newly acquired colonies that propelled most of the 
larger economies of the Atlantic model. They were practically land locked and remote 
from the main Atlantic trade routes. When industrialization took up in the ECE region 
during the second half of the nineteenth century it was already delated by centuries 
compared with the Atlantic model. Nevertheless, this progressive epoch was perhaps the 
most successful in modern ECE history in terms of narrowing the development gap 
(Szanyi and Szabó, 2020). Foreign dominance in the economy, dependence from more 
powerful states resulted in prolonged latecomer situations in the region. The smaller 
size of the economies, the land-locked status, weak domestic capital accumulation and 
the relative under-development also meant that ECE countries were effectively forced to 
rely on the support of larger countries both politically and economically. ECE region 
became the interest area of Germany, later the Soviet Union. Today the European Union 
plays this role. External financial support is also required in order to keep pace with 
worldwide economic development. The obtained finances have been returned in form of 
political cooperation. 
A third important systemic element of the special ECE development path is the role of 
ethnic conflicts in the state mastered orientation (manipulation) of the societies. The 
homogenization of the societies has not been successful, and the existence of ethnic 
minorities, lack of social cohesion has always been treated as a primary reason for the 
latecomer status and weak economic progress. This type of ethnic rivalry has flourished 
since the early nineteenth century. Countries of the Atlantic model made serious efforts 
to manage the still existing ethnic conflicts with peaceful political and institutional 
solutions. In the ECE model however, ethnic conflicts play an important systemic role: 
they divert public attention from the fundamental reason of weak economic 
performance and underdevelopment, the system of rent economy. Due to this reason the 
conflicts are deliberately fueled by the political parties and sometimes also governments 
of the ECE region (Szanyi, 2019). 
The rent-based economy works with limited growth capacity. Economic progress is a 
function of external financing coming from the dominant power and today also 
multinational firms’ economic activity contributes to macroeconomic stability. The 
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politically more interesting part of the economy where the rents are created exclude 
competition and work with limited efficiency. The system as a whole is still stable, but 
does not develop with highest potential speed. Competitive multinational firms may also 
withdraw much of the locally realized incomes if they are troubled by global shocks or 
simply when they find more secure and better yielding investment opportunities. Hence, 
the long-term development performance of the rent-based ECE countries falls short of 
the potentials. This limited development pace threatens with the middle income trap. A 
significant and qualitative change and increase of the development path would need 
massive investments in the society. This does not happen since neither the rent-based 
sector nor multinational business is willing to reallocate profits for these purposes. The 
state uses its resources mainly as new sources of rent and also for servicing the 
multinational companies to secure their presence. 
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